A theme that runs through the readings is the notion that contemporary surveillance is totalizing and complete (or seemingly total). The common point of comparison, Bentham’s Panopticon (through Foucault) is useful for thinking about surveillance and affect, but it might also be limiting because the Panopticon is oriented around a center/periphery structure with a singular guard that cannot look in all directions at once. Does this match the contours of contemporary surveillance, or do our surveillance structures take on different shapes (distributed, piecemeal, computationally surveilled, “un-intuable correlations” (Andrejevic and Gates 187))? As Gates and Andrejevic point out, structural incompleteness is a characteristic of big data (where the sheer size of datasets is meant to make up for any inaccuracies (189-190).
How do notions of accuracy and completeness play out in our understandings of surveillance? While the systems of surveillance described by Gates and Andrejevic are seemingly total, it still requires the coordination of numerous different systems and infrastructures to create a composite picture of someone’s movements. There is not yet a surveillance singularity, but given our discussion on infrastructure last week, are we on our way to it?
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